This article develops an equilibrium pricing model examining the nature of health insurance contracts by considering the relationship between information about risk types and equilibrium prices. Both community-rated (pooling) and risk-rated (separating) premia may co-exist under certain conditions, given that the insurer can observe the real risk type of the insured by spending some fixed amount on information. The higher the costs of determining risk class, the more heterogeneous will be the risk types offered insurance at the same (or pooling) premium. Also, the higher the mean and variance of the risk type distribution for the population, the more relatively healthy insureds would prefer risk-rated contracts to communityrated contracts.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of equilibrium pricing under adverse selection has received much attention. Most studies show different equilibria of either community-rated (pooling) contracts or risk-rated (separating) contracts based on sorting of risk types (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977 ). An equilibrium pricing policy taking the form of community-rated contracting means that each member of the community pays the same premium independently of whether the individual is perceived to be a high health risk or a low health risk. Risk-rated contracts establish a premium appropriate for each insured's expected medical costs.
1 Pauly (1986) points out that medical care insurance markets are different from other conventional insurance markets. Not only is the probability of an illness for a particular individual unknown to the insurer, but the level of actual loss of illness also is unknown to the insurer. Ignorance about the loss probability may cause problems with adverse selection. Ignorance about the actual loss may result in moral hazard. Our concern here is the issue with adverse selection rather than moral hazard. 2 Light (1992) notes 10 percent of the population accounts for 70 percent of all medical spending. 3 Wilson (1977) introduces an alternative concept of equilibrium in which each firm will correctly anticipate the response of other firms to changes in its own policy offer. Under the assumptions of the firm's nonstatic expectation, he shows that an equilibrium will exist. 4 For example, age and sex are two (risk) characteristics observable by insurers at low cost. previous health condition. 1 Also, the risk-rated structure differs in terms of individual, small group, and large group plans (Light, 1992; Gauthier et al., 1995) .
Unlike with large groups organized for purposes other than health insurance, there is no reason to pool individual plans except for purposes of health insurance. Providers of individual plans try to avoid adverse selection by taking steps to screen potential insureds-e.g., examining medical records, excluding pre-existing conditions from coverage, and limiting the provider's maximum exposure. In the limit, risk-rated contracts establish a premium for each insured appropriate to that insured's expected medical costs during the life of the contract. Thus, in the individual market the insurer would tend to charge very expensive plans for those few disadvantaged by poor health.
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This result might explain the fact that risk-rated policies tend to result in a growing number of uncovered medical conditions and uninsured doctor and hospital bills.
Like individual plans, small group plans make it more difficult to diffuse risks than do large plans. When a group gets larger, the average expected medical cost would be less likely to vary. According to Aaron and Bosworth, insurance premium for groups of fewer than 10 employees commonly are 25 to 30 percent above those for groups of 50 or more. Also, around 73 percent of small firms with fewer than 10 employees did not offer health insurance in 1990. In contrast, only 2 percent of large firms with more than 100 employees did not provide health insurance (Aaron and Bosworth, 1994) .
This article develops an equilibrium pricing model examining the nature of health insurance contracts by considering the relationship between information about risk type and price equilibrium, given different assumptions about individual health states, risk types, and adverse selection. The author shows that either a pooling or a mixed equilibrium is possible, based on the assumption of equilibrium concept suggested by Wilson (1977) . 3 The assumption of asymmetric information at the time of contracting means that information costs are critical to determining the type of equilibrium policy because it is costly to collect detailed information on the riskiness of individual customers. 4 Between a community-rated policy without verification costs and a risk-rated policy with verification costs, insureds will choose the policy with the smaller premium. A key finding is that both community-rated and risk-rated policies may co-exist in the case of multiple risk types under certain conditions, a finding different from that reached in earlier studies (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977) .
Healthier insureds would opt for risk-rated policies that include some additional signaling information costs. This means that the low risk types would purchase in-complete coverage. In contrast, more delicate insureds would prefer group insurance plans with community-rated premium. For example, an individual perceived to be in poor health, who is eligible to be a member of the employer-based plan, might be faced with paying a much higher premium under an individual risk-rated plan. However, a healthy employee, also eligible for the same employer-based plan, might opt for the lower premium of an individual risk-rated plan-even though such premium incorporates significant signaling-information costs.
The threshold risk types, for whom the community-rated premium equals the individual risk-rated premium, will depend on information costs and health care cost differences between relatively healthy and relatively unhealthy insureds. The higher the costs of determining risk class, the more heterogeneous will be the pooling contracts in the private market. In addition, the mean and variance of the risk distribution, which affect community-rated premia, play an important role in the possible outcomes of the equilibrium policy. These results may account for the observed price differential among individual, small group, and large group plans (Aaron and Bosworth, 1994) . Hence, this model might be useful to explain the actual premium structure in a competitive health insurance market.
This article is organized so that the next section develops a theoretical model examining the nature of equilibrium in the pricing of health insurance contracts. After the model, a comparative static analysis is presented, then the major findings of this article are summarized.
THE MODEL

Community-Rated Policies
Hoy (1988) examines the social value of symmetric information by the mean-variance approach. He finds that firms could charge the risk-rated premium for insurance policy according to each consumer's risk type if costless classification is implemented. If firms are risk averse or face a too-costly-to-maintain solvency constraint, then costless categorization of individuals by risk type would lead to a reduction in the average price of insurance. He also analyzes the effect on welfare involving the trade-off between positive effects of production efficiency (defined as reduction of the average price) and premium risks' adverse effects (caused by the costless classification). Hoy's mean-variance approach can be used to extend the analysis of community-rated premium.
For expository purposes, the distribution of the medical loss for the total population would approach a log-normal distribution (Manning et al., 1986) . 5 Assume that the risk types of the total population range from the most healthy person Intuitively, a community-rated premium, P C , would be contingent on the medical loss distribution of the total population. For example, the pool containing all from a person of risk type x j to the least healthy person, x n , would be formulated as
The f x ( ) notation is the log-normal distribution of the total population's medical loss described by the parameters µ and σ , which refer to the mean and standard deviation of the related Normal model Y X = 1n . Equation (1) In Figure 1 , AB represents the locus of P C , appropriate to each continuous insurance pool ranging from any specific risk type x j to the most delicate person x n in the community.
Point B corresponds to only the most delicate x n ( ) being in the pool, that is P x c n n ( ) → . Thus, the vertical value of point B shows the anticipated medical loss for the risk type x n and also represents the highest premium P C . In contrast, point A corresponds to the anticipated medical loss averaged when all risk types present in the community join the pool, that is, P x c l n
A must be the lowest premium for any continuous pool, which includes those from the most healthy to least healthy member of the community.
FIGURE 1 Community-Rated Premium
Since the probability distribution function (PDF) of the total population's medical loss is assumed to be represented by a log-normal distribution, most people in the population would be classified as risk types in the neighborhood of the population mean. Intuitively, the P C locus would decrease monotonically from the least healthy to the most healthy, at decreasing rates far from the mean and at increasing rates in neighborhoods around the mean, a characteristic captured by the shape of AB in Figure 1 .
It can be shown that P C is positively related to the factors of the "first" risk type x j ( ) included in the community's insurance pool, as well as the parameters µ and σ of the medical losses of the resulting community population.
Mathematically,
, and
where
[Appendices A and B provide proofs of equations (2), (3), and (4), respectively.]
Since the policy with premium P C includes members from the specific risk type x j to the least healthy x n , based on the assumption that the risk types can be ordered, the least healthy the risk type x j the larger will be the premium P C -as indicated in µ σ σ , respectively, it is easy to show that the expected value and variance are related positively to the parameters µ σ σ , for { } > 0 . It follows from equations (3) and (4) that the greater the mean of the total population's medical losses and the greater the standard deviation among the risk types, the greater the corresponding P C . This suggests that higher anticipated average medical losses or greater uncertainty among risk types in a population would tend to increase the appropriate pooling premium for that population.
Risk-Rated Policies
Under conditions of a competitive market, insurers are assumed to transfer information costs to insureds. In other words, individuals bear the costs of providing relevant information to insurers in exchange for actuarially fair premia. For instance, insureds might pay the physical examination fee in hopes of demonstrating a more favorable health condition and justifying a lower premium. Alternatively, insurers might contract for physical examinations, passing such costs on to insureds in the form of higher policy premia. In other words, for relatively healthy insureds, there is a trade-off between signaling costs and subsidy costs for those who are relatively unhealthy insureds. 6 6 Crocker and Snow (1986) conclude that, in terms of its costs, risk categorization by insurance companies did not have a definite effect on welfare. If the resource cost of observing the categorizing signal is negligible, then categorizing always would be potentially Pareto superior to not categorizing. However, if resource costs are not negligible, winners might not be able to compensate the losers of costly categorization.
For simplicity, it is assumed that insurers could observe the real attributes of potential insureds by spending money for information. The cost of obtaining actual information regarding the real risk types would depend on risk type. Based on the attribute age, for example, there is some k for younger people to predict their expected loss lower than the k for older people by considering either the probability or number of illness. 7 Thus, the risk-rated premium P X R j ( ) would be determined for each risk type by that type's anticipated medical loss distribution µ j and relevant level of information costs, expressed as some fixed cost k 0 plus k x j ( ) . In addition, obtaining information about risk attributes is assumed to be subject to strongly diminishing returns, that is, dk x dx
The premium for a risk-rated policy, P R , would be
where µ µ
For any continuous distribution, there must exist a risk type h that will be just indifferent between paying a risk-rated premium and accepting the premium charged to the population's most delicate member: that is, for whom µ µ
). This implies that the more delicate people in a community would be less likely to prove their real health state by providing relevant information to insurers at cost k. P R is an increasing function of the risk type x j .
FIGURE 2 Risked-Rated Premium
Premium Risk Type
In Figure 2 , the locus of the points CH is equal to the vertical summation of the actuarially expected medical loss for each risk type over the range x x h 1 , , K ( ) and the information cost. The risk types for whom the anticipated medical loss is greater than x h would not spend the signaling cost to verify their risk types. Thus, the locus of P R would be depicted as the kinked curve CHB, as shown in Figure 2 . Point H, corresponding to µ h h k k x + + 0 ( ), equals the value of µ n .
7 A referee deserves thanks for pointing out this related analysis.
Equilibrium Premium Policy
The equilibrium policy can be deduced from Figure 3 . If point A were lower than point C, then only policy P C would be available in equilibrium. Without incurring any information costs to recognize each individual's real risk type, the anticipated average medical loss when all risk types are in the community pool would be lower than the most healthy insured's expected medical losses plus information costs required to prove risk type to insurers.
FIGURE 3 Equilibrium Premium-Signal Pooling
If point A is higher than point C, then both P R and P C policies could exist since a point must exist at which AB and CHB intersect. At point e in Figure 3 , the associated risk type x e would pay the same premium for a community-based health insurance policy as for a risk-rated health insurance policy. That is, for information costs k such that A C > , there must exist a risk type such that
The risk type x e satisfying condition (6) can be thought of as the threshold risk type.
For risk types to the left of x e , a risk-rated premium P R would be less than the corresponding community-based premium P C . For risk types to the right of x e , the community-based premium P C would be less than the corresponding risk-rated premium P R . ] paying premium a than buying risk-rated contracts at premia along bc. Therefore, the stable threshold risk type would be x a .
COMPARATIVE STATICS
According to the result in equation (6), the threshold risk type, x e , would vary depending on the factors affecting anticipated medical losses of the total population and information costs. By differentiation of equation (6), the following comparative results can be derived: 
The results of comparative static analysis in equations (7) through (9) also can be illustrated graphically, as in Figure 5 , Figure 6 , and Figure 7 , respectively. The implication of equation (7) is that the higher the information costs, the greater the range of risk types preferring a community-rated policy, P C , to a risk-rated policy, P R .
8 In other words, community insurance pools will contain a (relatively) wide range of risk types. This result is illustrated in Figure 5 , where CHB shifts upward in a parallel fashion as information costs increase from K 1 to K 2 . Hence, the higher the costs of determining risk class, the more heterogeneous will be the community pooling contracts.
FIGURE 5
The Effect of Increasing Information Costs In contrast, both mean and variance will affect the (conditional) pooling premium through the distribution of risk types, as stated in equations (3) and (4). Equation (8) suggests that an increase in the mean of the community medical loss distribution will raise the value of the threshold risk type and increase the equilibrium pooling premium. That is, in comparing two communities in which Community 2 has rela-tively more less-healthy people and relatively few more-healthy people, Community 2 will be characterized by A'B and Community 1 by AB, as shown in Figure 4 . As a result, more relatively healthy insureds will opt for risk-rated policies, P R .
Finally, the outcome of equation (9) means that the higher the variance of community medical losses, the more relatively healthy insureds would prefer separating risk-rated contracts. This means that an increase in the variance of the risk distribution would result in a non-parallel shifting upward of the P C curve, as demonstrated in Figure 7 . Since the mean of the total population remains constant, the position of points A and B on the curve P C remains the same. 
CONCLUSION
This article developed a model through which the nature of health insurance contracts can be examined. It assumes that the real risk type to which an insured belongs can be observed at some fixed cost, a cost individuals bear to provide relevant information to insurers in exchange for an actuarially fair premium. Under the conditions of asymmetric information with multiple risk types, the single-period model shows that both community-rated (pooling) and risk-rated (separating) contracts may coexist. The threshold risk type of analysis suggests that the higher the mean and the greater the variance of a population's risk distribution, the more healthy insureds would prefer risk-rated separating contracts. However, the higher the costs of determining risk class, the more heterogeneous will be the community pooling contracts.
The implications even of this single-period model seem at least casually consistent with the structure of premia observed in various voluntary insurance markets. While lower premia are offered to the most healthy (those with the lowest expected losses), the highest premium is available to, and accepted by, a relatively wide range of risk types. The less healthy (those with the highest expected losses) do not end up in a separate "high-ended" risk-rated contract. Rather, they come to be pooled with other less healthy (those with lower expected losses). Empirical testing of this proposition, however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
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